The ground plan for the liberation of Bangladesh was based on four major axes of advance. On the east side, the Indian IV Corps with three divisions along with 'K' and 'S' Forces would secure the eastern part of Bangladesh up to the banks of Meghna inclusive of Chittagong. The Indian XXXIII Corps with two divisions would secure the northern region up to the western banks of the Jamuna/ Brahmaputra north of the Padma. Two divisions of the Indian II Corps would clear south-western region all the way to the banks of the Padma. A composite division along with 'Z' force would clear the north-eastern part of the country. The plan did not envisage the liberation of Dacca. Instead, the planners felt that if the major river and sea ports on the southern coast of Bangladesh were secured quickly, all withdrawal routes of evacuation would be cut off and then Dacca (now Dhaka) would fall. The Mukti Bahini would assist the Indian army and conduct harassing operations behind the enemy lines. The Indian Air Force was tasked to establish complete air superiority in Bangladesh within the first forty-eight hours of hostilities. A naval task force with India's lone aircraft carrier, Vikrant, with its full complement of other ships established a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal covering the coast of Bangladesh. The newly created Bangladesh Air Force, with its two helicopters anti lone fixed wing aircraft was tasked to destroy the fuel dumps in Chittagong, Narayanganj and Khulna.
The ground offensive started on December 4, 1971. Except for a few places, most Pakistani positions gave up without a fight. With the help of the Mukti Bahini, the advancing columns were able to bypass most Pakistani strong points and get behind the enemy to continue with their advance. Whenever the Pakistanis found that they were cut off, they gave up. The brigade garrisons of Jessore and Comilla evacuated and surrendered respectively without a fight. A fierce tank battle raged in Hilli of Dinajpur district where the Pakistanis fought doggedly. The Indians dropped a parachute brigade in Tangail for the final showdown in Dacca. By December 14, the Indians were at Mirpur Bridge in the outskirts of Dacca. India had earlier accorded diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh on December 6.
The Nixon Administration was hell bent on saving Pakistan from breaking up; it saw the situation in Bangladesh as a cold war conflict where the Soviet Union was India's ally and by extension a patron of Bangladesh. Although many democrats in the US Congress and Senate were sympathetic to the Bangladesh cause because of the humanitarian tragedy. [Edward Kennedy in his speech to the Senate on December 8 differed from the Nixon ministration's position and laid out the background of the Bangladesh Struggle. He stated that war in Bangladesh did not start with the commencement of open hostilities between India and Pakistan. War started on March 25, when Pakistan launched its genocide on the people of Bangladesh and for the past nine months this war has been raging was the Administration did nothing to stop the human tragedy. His speech was critical of the misleading statements of the Nixon Administration]. The Administration hawks, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig, would leave no stone unturned to stop the liberation of Bangladesh, if for no other reason but only to stop the Soviets in their tracks. For the first time in its tenure, the Nixon Administration used the hotline to communicate with Moscow. The communiqué stated that Washington may act unilaterally to intervene in the conflict to save Pakistan from breaking up. Moscow responded by simply stating that India had no territorial ambitions in the west.
The Americans were also trying their hardest to get the Chinese into the fray on Pakistan's behalf. China assembled its 53rd Independent Division along the Tibet border and several other units were also deployed along the Sino Indian border. The winter was not severe and the Himalayan mountain passes were open in the first week of December. In reality, the Chinese deployment was actually a show of force rather than a real threat for the Indians for two reasons. First, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was going through a shake up after its leader Lin Biao was killed in a plane crash while trying to escape to the Soviet Union following an abortive coup. Getting the PLA involved in an armed conflict was too risky for the Chinese leadership. The second reason was that the Soviets had deployed ground and air forces along the Sinkiang border and had their missile forces target several Chinese targets. The Soviet Ambassador in Delhi assured the Indian Government not to worry about the Chinese; if the Chinese entered the fray, the Soviets would mount a diversionary attack.
Under the guise of evacuating its citizens, the Nixon Administration dispatched a task force from the US 7th Fleet with the USS Enterprise complemented with necessary support ships, warplanes, helicopters and ground forces to the Bay of Bengal on December 9. When the fleet reached the Strait of Malacca, its voyage was halted for more than twenty four hours when it was discovered that the Soviet Pacific Fleet was positioned five hundred miles off the coast of Ceylon. The Soviet Fleet was augmented with more ships and was heading towards the Bay of Bengal. Eventually, the 7th Fleet task force did not come near the Bangladesh coast. [In a television interview, Admiral Vladamir Kruglyakov, the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, stated that a British Naval Task Force led by the aircraft carrier Eagle was heading for the western coast of India on December 13. The presence of the Soviet fleet stopped the advance. The Soviet Commander stated that he even intercepted communication between the British and American Commanders where the British Commander expressed concern that his force arrived too late and were in the sights of the Soviet Fleet. See Rakesh Krishnan Simha, "1971 War: How Russia sank Nixon's Gunboat Diplomacy," Russia & India Report, December 20, 2011, New Delhi.]
The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh arrived in New York on December 10 to participate in the Security Council debates at the UN. Earlier, the Soviet Union had vetoed four proposals tabled by the US and its allies for a cease fire. The Soviets had privately instructed the Indians to complete their operations in Bangladesh by the end of December. They would not be able to veto the Polish proposal in the Security Council which stipulated a peaceful, handover of power to the elected representatives of Bangladesh and the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The handover of power, however, would be preceded by a cease fire and any UN intervention would give Pakistan the lifeline it urgently needed. Swaran Singh understood the stakes and gave a long speech that lasted two days, so that allied ground forces in Bangladesh could finish the job at hand by forcing the Pakistanis to surrender.
Getting back to Sector 7, my combat duties were reduced following my injury. I mainly stayed in the defence. After India declared war on Pakistan, Jahangir sent me on patrol to Gomastapur and link up with Bazlu and Rafiq. I was to convey Jahangir's instructions to them; their location was outside the walkie-talkie range and we did not have any communication with them. The two were to advance along the Gomastapur-Chapai Nawabganj axis and take up a defensive position outside the enemy's mortar range. After that, I was to fall back to Argararhat and wait for orders; my company remained in the main defence in Sona Masjid. In Argararhat, there was not a whole lot to do except listen to the radio and follow the progress of war. All India Radio was transmitting Manekshaw's message for the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh to surrender. The Pakistanis were not only getting a thrashing in Bangladesh, they were being routed in the western front as well. So much for their invincibility!
A Qayyum Khan is a freedom fighter who joined Mukti Bahini the earliy days of the liberation war when he was a student of University of Dhaka.He was commissioned during the war and fought in sector 7 as a second lieutenant. The piece is excerpted from his book titled 'Bittersweet Victory: A Freedom Fighter's tale' published by University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2013.
