In a classical work sixty-odd years ago, Kenneth N. Waltz traced policy-making impulses to three levels (what he called 'images'): the individual, state, and the international system. Though he unabashedly pushed the systemic interpretations above all else, Bangla-India relations vividly demonstrate the historical value of each dimension. Yet, the more interesting question, given the nature of our liberation war, is whether those relations remain routine, that is, typical diplomatic relations filled with reciprocities, or seep deeper, as in bonding, or, indeed, both.
That Sheikh Hasina was met at the airport by Narendra Modi in her April 2017 New Delhi visit evokes the strength of the state-state interpretation, yet since Modi does not routinely greet dignitaries by the arriving plane-side, a personal-level element also enters the equation. Over a score agreements were signed promoting inter-connectivity of all sorts, from economic to the military: from opening new credit lines to investments within Bangladesh, on the economic fronts; and from purchasing defence hardware to civil nuclear cooperation, on the military front. Leaders may come and go, but agreements typically outlast them, breathe new life, open new vistas, and strengthen state-level dynamics. Do these feed the bonding process?
Even if a relationship dips given a leadership change, the state's role could expand rather than diminish, possibly even deepen. Khaleda Zia's hostile relationship with India, for example, coincided with extremism spurting in both countries, forcing Bangladeshi and Indian state apparatuses to become more alert and active, with the now-more-tightened borders demonstrating that vividly.
We can conclude, as many in the media do, the state has played a fundamental instigating role in both countries in bilateral relations. This could have been for protection (by positioning border-guards, building fences, necessitating travel visas, and so forth), to facilitate transactions (as over trade and investment flows through tariffs or customs inspection), or serve as a platform for joint international action, like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sector Technological and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). This was as true, perhaps even more so when a secular Bangladesh emerged in 1971 (with critical Indian support), as when it turned to Islam from 1978, showing the historical depth of the state-state channel. Still, other channels beg attention, both historically and concurrently.
Bangladesh emerged from a domestic development that went wrong (the 1970 election results being denied), generated a regional crisis (through 10 million refugees generously hosted by India), before degenerating into a superpower showdown (China and the United States rallying behind Pakistan, the Soviet Union behind India for Bangladesh, both in 1971; and when the world also scurried to cater to those refugees). Had not a Washington decision to secretly send Henry Kissinger to China through Pakistan been taken right then, and similarly, had not an India-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation been signed in August 1971, that 'domestic development' alone might have altered the final outcome: US pressure upon Pakistan towards accommodating 'East Pakistan' might have increased; or the Soviet fleet's 'accidental' Indian port visitation in the Bay of Bengal might not have had any Bangladeshi connections when, in reality it served as a buffer against the US Seventh Fleet presence south of the Bay.
In fact, both the 'BIMSTEC' and 'Islam' references also expose an international systemic policy-making impulse. BIMSTEC exemplifies how global competition forced countries to make connectivity, or integrative, arrangements, much like the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) or the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar gas pipeline. Without such corridors, those April 2017 connectivity agreements would have been hollow. Similarly with Islam, how it opens a flank whereby another constellation of countries collectively induce any given member to make policy gestures it would not have made independently. Fearing extremist Islamic infiltration, both countries have no choice but to coordinate a common stand. Just as the superpower rivalry alluded to influenced Bangladeshi and Indian developments in the early 1970s, so too would a common stand against jihadis and brewing China-US rivalry in the region. Hasina's defence-related deals with India, in fact, might not have happened if China was not supplying a majority of Bangladeshi defence artifacts, including its first submarine.
Formulating strategies of this kind, even preparing routine policy positions, is the responsibility of the country leaders: being abstract, institutional, and/or a platform, the state cannot initiate them; it can face the emotions and moods of people, but cannot feel or create them. At the least, not without a leader's input. Behind the hoopla of international ramifications and domestic calculations, the individual-level input often gets lost. Should it deepen or become crucial, we might have to recapture its origin and evolution retrospectively unless a careful diplomatic (or scholarly) eye is not kept on it constantly.
It was not that the Hasina-Modi rapport is built upon a rock-solid relationship: Modi himself bashed Bangladeshi immigrants during his election campaigns on behalf of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Hasina had a similar rapport with BJP's key opponent, that is, the Congress Party's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. She could befriend two very unlike, even mutually incongruous, Indian leaders, in part, due to one man, the retiring Indian president, Pranab Mukherjee, to whom she has been most indebted for as long as Bangladesh has been in existence. Mukherjee single-handedly got Bangladesh through its three most demanding moments over its last 46 years. In 1971, he played a pivotal role for Indira Gandhi in setting up the Mujibnagar Provisional Government, without which Bangladesh would have died a stillborn baby; then sheltering Hasina, together with her family, after Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated in 1975; and, finally, the Hasina-Manmohan amity (further fertilised by Sonia Gandhi), crucially salvaging the country's reputation abroad when the 2014 election ostracised Bangladesh.
As the most reliable bridge between Delhi and Dhaka, and in warming Modi to Hasina, Mukherhjee's value will be severely tested after his imminent retirement. May be that is what spurred Hasina's April 2017 visit the most: a fitting farewell to a silently central figure in her personal, familial, and national lives. If that is the case, whether what looks like true bonding will continue after him becomes the million-dollar question in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, no bonding can prevail without reference to the original source: Mujib's rapport with Indira.
Lower-level cross-border links have also shaped Bangla-India relations. Thriving border-smuggling or even border 'haat' (market) transactions exemplify that, suggesting spaces for bonding. So too would the several societal-level trans-border bonds. Many former refugees still retain connections with their 1971 hosts (unlike in 1947, when migrants faced communal violence and fed a generation-long era of recrimination). With Rabindranath Tagore penning the national anthems in both countries, and even the freer and more frequent flows of Hindu citizens both ways, cultural exchanges have long littered the calendar. Clearly, the scope of expanding such bonds is certainly there.
Yet, cross-border and individual-level relations need not always be positive or productive. Mamata Banerjee plays an extraordinary role, for instance, as much for her vehement opposition to the Teesta joint-river agreement, as to the nature of policy-level analysis. She could easily have exerted an individual-level input had she directly discussed Teesta with Hasina to produce an agreement. As leader of a province inside India, her veto on this subject ties Modi's centre-level policy-enacting hands. Even more unfairly to her, her Teesta support would end up crediting the centre, and not necessarily West Bengal, as the engine and agency. Even as a sub-state representative, though, she exemplifies how policy-making can be influenced by groups within the state, thus opening a Pandora's Box in which grassroots and non-state organisations can also slide in, as did the refugees from 1971 and the free-flowing two-way Hindu traffic ever since. These are the products of democracy, precisely what India argued we showed with the 2014 election that other countries were not convinced by.
What do all of these mean? For a start, no policy-maker or policy-making unit can be considered an island. Since every level goes through its high tides and low, no policy-maker or policy-making unit can ever adopt/implement the 'be-all' and 'end-all' policy, indeed, the viability of each and every policy might depend on how every policy-making level has been retrospectively and concurrently scrutinised for inputs and outcomes. If bonding is added to that, the seeds of a durable relationship of the Anglo-American of Canadian-US type, prevails. Bangladesh and India are not there as yet since the leadership-level bonding has not sufficiently trickled down to the people, but the more the 'bits and pieces' of policy agreements made, stronger personal bonding and warmer relations would fortify both countries as they stand at the cusp of momentous opportunities: crossing them will be costly for both without more than a dosage of camaraderie at all levels.
Dr. Imtiaz A. Hussain is Professor & Head of the newly-built Department of Global Studies & Governance at Independent University, Bangladesh.
[email protected]
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